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Abstract 
 
Countries rich in natural resources constitute both development failures and 
successes depending on their underlying socioeconomic fundamentals. Recent 
empirical evidence and theoretical work provide support to a resource curse 
hypothesis based on ethnic fractionalization; rivaling ethnic groups engaging in 
resource rent-seeking weaken property rights and erode institutional quality reducing 
hence long-term growth. On another front, there is increasing empirical evidence 
suggesting that ethnic heterogeneity based on polarization rather than 
fractionalization is a stronger deterrent of economic growth. In this paper, we explore 
the interlinkages between natural resource abundance and both measures of ethnic 
heterogeneity. In a two-simultaneous equation system, we assess the effects of 
fractionalization and polarization on institutions, and thereof on growth, both directly 
as well as interacted with our resource abundance proxy. We find that while ethnic 
fractionalization has a direct negative impact on the effectiveness of property rights, 
polarization affects institutions only in a resource-rich context. We find that resource 
wealth lowers income in ethnically polarized rather than fractionalized countries, a 
result robust to different specifications adopted, as well as when controlling for the 
direct impacts of fractionalization and polarization on growth.   
 
Keywords: Natural Resources, Growth, Fractionalization, Polarization.  
JEL classification: C31, O11, O13   
 
 
Introduction 
 
Numerous empirical and theoretical studies have recently linked resource abundance 
to poor economic development (Bulte et al. 2005; Sachs and Warner 1997, 2001). The 
negative correlation between economic growth and resource-abundance, albeit a solid 
fact, still is a conceptual puzzle. Early development economists accentuated the role of 
natural resource wealth in economic development (Nurkse 1953; Rostow 1960; Watkins 
1963). The industrial revolution in Great Britain and Germany was, for instance, largely 
supported by their vast domestic deposits of ore and coal, in an era of high 
transportation costs (Matsuyama 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995). Over the last four 
decades, natural resource abundance has been a development curse for most resource-
dependent economies. This is by no means an iron law, and as Auty (2001) suggests, 
the long-term impact of resource wealth on economic performance depends on 
country-specific socioeconomic fundamentals.  
 
Sachs and Warner (2001) suggest that natural resources do not inhibit economic growth 
per se, but rather, they crowd-out growth-promoting activities. Several transmission 
channels have been identified through which resource rents lower economic growth 
rates. A first stream of work focuses on Dutch Disease explanations of the curse, linking 
resource booms with overvalued domestic currencies and reduced exports. Positive 
income shocks from natural resource exploitation trigger inflationary pressure in the 
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economy, hurting hence the competitiveness of commodities outside the primary 
sector. Manufacturing and other sectors conducive to growth are likely hence to 
contract, as exports decrease and production factors shift towards primary production 
(Corden and Neary 1982; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Torvik 2002).  
 
A second branch of the resource curse literature focuses on the impact of natural 
resources on institutional quality, particularly via rent-seeking and corruption (Bulte et 
al. 2005; Dalmazzo and De Blasio 2003; Sachs and Warner 1999, 2001; Torvik 2002; Wick 
and Bulte 2006). Political theories of institutional quality, as in La Porta et al. (1999) and 
Robinson and Torvik (2005), suggest that institutions are often endogenously shaped by 
public officials to help prolong their stay in power. In the same tune, Ross (1999) claims 
that governments in resource-rich countries make use of resource revenues to relieve 
social pressure (i.e. via increased spending on patronage or reduced taxation) that 
would otherwise lead to greater demand for accountability. La Porta et al. (1999) claim 
that institutions are often not shaped by consideration of social welfare, but rather 
become determined by the ability of various economic agents (ethnic groups, political 
parties, industrial organizations) to extract rents and self-finance their dominant 
positions. Natural resources, such as oil and precious metals, are geographically 
concentrated and easily embezzled, creating hence a large incentive for individuals and 
government officials in resource-rich countries to adopt rent-seeking behaviour and 
corrupt practices respectively. Rent-seeking activity consecutively diverts 
entrepreneurial talent away from productive activities, decreasing hence total income 
and welfare (Lian and Oneal 1997; Torvik 2002; Wick and Bulte 2006)1. Such rent-
seeking competition is likely to be intensified across ethnically heterogeneous groups 
making cooperative solutions difficult to achieve and favouring short-term 
opportunism over long-term planning (Alesina et al. 2003). In this context, public goods 
are likely to be underprovided, especially when the preferences of individual groups 
for public investment diverge (Easterly and Levine 1997).  
  
In a recent paper, Hodler (2006) claims that ethnic fractionalization interacted with 
natural resource abundance explains why “the impact of natural resources may differ 
in different resource-rich countries” (Hodler 2006, p. 1382). Hodler finds a significant 
negative correlation between the level of income levels and the interaction term 
between ethnic fractionalization and the share of natural capital in total capital. In his 
empirical analysis, accounting for ethnic fractionalization cancels out any negative 
direct impact of resource wealth on income, as suggested in the resource curse 
literature. In parallel, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a; 2005b) have recently 
suggested that ethnic heterogeneity based on polarization rather than 
fractionalization is likely to be a stronger deterrent of long-term growth. While 
fractionalization measures the probability of two randomly chosen individuals from a 
                                                 
1 Secure property rights on the other hand constrain elites in forming and imposing successful 
predatory strategies (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). 
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given country belonging to ethnically distinct groups, polarization indices also focus on 
the relative size of rivalling groups. In this context, the fractionalization index 
approaches unity as the number of rivalling groups increases, while the polarization 
index reaches one in the case of bipolar distribution of two ethnic groups of equal size2. 
According to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a; 2005b), polarized societies with 
large rivalling groups of comparable size are more prone to growth-retarding rent-
seeking behaviour and conflict. The polarization index captures to a larger extent hence 
the potential conflictual relationships between groups compared to the fractionalization 
measure, which is simply based on their number. In this paper, we bring the two 
streams of literature together by exploring the interlinkages between natural resource 
abundance and both measures of ethnic heterogeneity. We explore whether natural 
resource abundance is more prone to be a development curse when the country is 
highly polarized than fractionalized, since in this case polarized rivalling groups 
need to intensify their rent-seeking behaviour by competing with groups of similar 
size. The absence of clearly dominant groups in polarized societies is likely to 
intensify frictions between contestants and erode pro-growth institutions based on 
cooperation and property right protection. While the same argument linking 
institutions and ethnic heterogeneity holds for fractionalization as well (Alesina et al. 
2003; Collier 2001; Easterly and Levine 1997; Hodler 2006; La Porta et al. 1999), we 
contribute to the resource curse literature by studying the differentiated impact of 
natural resource rent-seeking on institutional quality (and thereof on growth) 
between ethnically polarized and fractionalized contexts. To our knowledge this is 
the first empirical study that attempts to differentiate between the role of ethnic 
fractionalization and polarization to explain the resource curse paradox. 
  
The next section is devoted to the empirical evidence on the interlinkages between 
resource-abundance and ethnic structure (fractionalization, polarization), as well as 
their direct and indirect (via institutional quality) effects on economic growth, We 
find that while ethnic fractionalization has a direct negative impact on the 
effectiveness of property rights, polarization affects institutions only in a resource-
rich context. Contrary to earlier empirical results in the literature, we find that 
resource wealth lowers income in ethnically polarized rather than fractionalized 
countries, a result robust to different specifications adopted. In Section 3 we extend 
our analysis by focusing on income levels rather than economic growth as a 
                                                 
2 There is generally a non-linear relationship between indices of ethnic fractionalization and 
polarization. The general formulas for ethnic fractionalisation and polarization are frac= 1-∑
=
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 respectively, where π is the proportion of people that belongs to the i-th ethnic 
group. For an in-depth discussion on the construction of the indices, see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005a). 
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dependent variable and we verify that our main propositions hold. Section 4 
summarizes our main results and offers concluding remarks. 
 
 
Direct and Indirect Impacts of Ethnic Structure and Resource 
Abundance  
 
In this section we explore the type of ethnic heterogeneity (polarization, 
fractionalization) that relates to pro-growth institutions in a resource-rich context. 
We investigate whether powerful rivalling groups of similar size, as captured by 
polarization indices, are more important in enhancing rent-seeking conflictual 
behaviour, eroding institutions and property rights and reducing long-term growth. 
To identify the dependence of growth and institutions on natural resource 
abundance and ethnic heterogeneity, we estimate a two-simultaneous equation 
system, where natural resources interacted with ethnic structure (polarization, 
fractionalisation) affect the extent of institutional quality, with the latter being a 
strong determinant of economic growth.   
 
Our two-equation simultaneous system is summarized by equations 1 and 2. To 
identify the dependence of growth on institutions (equation 1) we estimate cross-
country growth regressions in the tradition of Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Grier 
and Tullock (1989), Barro (1991), and Sachs and Warner (1995; 1997). We include 
initial income per capita in our regressions to check for the conditional convergence 
hypothesis that predicts higher growth in response to lower starting income per 
capita keeping the other explanatory variables constant. Thus, per capita economic 
growth from period t0=1980 to tT=2004, denoted by growth=(1/T)ln(YT/Y0),  
depends on initial per capita income Y0 , on institutions (inst) and a vector of other 
explanatory variables common in the growth literature, captured by X3. Equation 2 
assesses the impact of ethnic structure alone (Z; being either fractionalization or 
polarization), as well as interacted with resource richness (nr) upon institutional 
quality. 
 
growth = a1 Y 0  + a2 inst + a3 X [1] 
inst = b1 Z + b2 nr*Z [2] 
 
We estimate the system making use of the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
technique, as in Easterly and Levine (1997) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a). 
SUR estimations allow for random correlation of the error term, increasing the 
efficiency of estimated coefficients (Zellner 1962) (and are virtually identical to the 
ordinary least squares estimations in case of no or near zero correlation). Since 
                                                 
3 Appendix I lists all variables and data sources. Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix II. 
The whole dataset is available upon request to the authors. 
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institutions appear both as a dependent and independent variable, the set of 
equations needs to be estimated simultaneously4. All variables linked to economic 
growth (i.e. investment, primary exports, institutional quality) are taken at the 
beginning of the period to minimize any endogeneity bias (Aron 2000). As in Hodler 
(2006) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a), we avoid entering the 
fractionalization and polarization proxies jointly into the estimated specifications to 
avoid multicollinearity.  
  
The estimations of our two-equation system are presented in Table 1. For all growth 
specifications (equation [1]), we include as independent variables the level of initial 
income (Y0), the ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP averaged in 1980 
(inv), the Sachs and Warner measure of resource abundance referring to the share of 
primary exports in total production in 1970, an index of openness, measured by the 
value of exports plus imports divided by the level of GDP in 1980 (open) a measure of 
institutions based on the quality of the judicial system and the extent of property 
rights protection (inst) and a geography index measuring the malaria disease 
environment and proximity to the tropics (geo). We expect countries characterized by 
higher investment rates, trade openness, lower initial income per capita, a disease-
free environment and better-quality institutions to experience faster economic 
growth (see, for instance, Sachs and Warner 1995). Data on income levels, institutions 
and the disease environment are provided by the World Bank Development 
Indicators (WDI, 2006), and Kiszewski et al. (2004) respectively. Data on trade 
openness and investment are provided by the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 
2006). In column entry (1) we additionally include fractionalization (frac) as an 
independent variable, and interact it with our resource abundance proxy as a 
determinant of institutions (frac*nr). In column entry (2) we substitute 
fractionalization with polarization (pol) as the ethnic heterogeneity proxy and 
similarly interact it with natural resources (pol*nr). The interaction terms aim to 
capture how the impact of ethnic diversity on property rights protection may differ 
between resource rich and resource scarce economies. Data on ethnic 
fractionalization and polarization are provided by Alesina et al. (2003) and Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol (2005a; 2005b) respectively.   
 
Our results reveal that institutional quality has a strongly significant and positive 
effect on economic growth, as suggested in the literature (Acemoglu et al. 2003; 
Rodrik et al. 2004). Ethnical polarization and fractionalization both appear to affect 
growth negatively, as in Holder (2006). For the rest of the independent variables in 
the growth regression, the signs of coefficients accord with intuition5. The estimation 
                                                 
4 Montalvo and Reynold (2005a) suggest that the SUR procedure is less sensitive to specification 
errors. 
5 It is worth noticing that once we account for differences in institutions and ethnic diversity, the direct 
effect of natural resource abundance on growth generally becomes insignificant (as in Mehlum et al. 
2006). 
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of the institutions channel (equation [2]) in columns (1) and (2) reveals that while 
ethnic fractionalization has a direct negative impact on the effectiveness of property 
rights, polarization affects institutions only in a resource-rich context6.  
 
This suggests that while fractionalized countries suffer from weak institutions (and 
hence lower growth) irrespective of the availability of natural resources, polarized 
countries experience enhanced rent-seeking and weak property rights only in the 
presence of an extensive resource base. In this case, natural resources do not 
contribute to a resource curse directly, but indirectly via eroding pro-development 
institutions. We find that resource wealth lowers income in ethnically polarized 
rather than rights, polarization affects institutions only in a resource-rich context7. 
This suggests that while fractionalized countries suffer from weak institutions (and 
hence lower growth) irrespective of the availability of natural resources, polarized 
countries experience enhanced rent-seeking and weak property rights only in the 
presence of an extensive resource base. In this case, natural resources do not 
contribute to a resource curse directly, but indirectly via eroding pro-development 
institutions. We find that resource wealth lowers income in ethnically polarized 
rather than fractionalized countries, a result that remains robust when controlling for 
the direct impacts of fractionalization and polarization on growth. The effect is of 
significant magnitude, suggesting that the impact of polarization on institutions 
between a generally homogenous country (such as Denmark) and a fully polarized 
nation (such as Guatemala) has no impact on institutions when countries are 
resource scarce, but reduces drastically the institutional proxy (1-10 scale property 
rights index) by approximately 0.5 points for every 10% increment of the share of 
primary exports in production (see, regression (2). This confirms that resource rent 
seeking behaviour becomes more pronounced in ethnically polarized societies, where 
“winner takes all” successful strategies require considerably larger effort (Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol (2005a, 2005b). Consecutively, the negative impact of natural 
resources on institutions for ethnically polarized nations will extend to economic 
growth, as suggested by the strong beneficial impact of property rights protection on 
income growth (Table 1).  
 
 
                                                 
6 The coefficients of ethnic polarization, as well as fractionalization interacted with natural resources, 
are statistically insignificant, although of the expected sign. 
7 The coefficients of ethnic polarization, as well as fractionalization interacted with natural resources, 
are statistically insignificant, although of the expected sign. 
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Table 1. Growth and institutions: SUR estimations 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
growth Y 0  
-0.166 
(0.055)*** 
-0.148 
(0.055)*** 
-0.166 
(0.055)*** 
-0.147 
(0.055)*** 
-0.163 
(0.056)*** 
 inst 
0.135 
(0.038)*** 
0.127 
(0.039)*** 
0.132 
(0.038)*** 
0.133 
(0.039)*** 
0.129 
(0.039)*** 
 geo 
-0.018 
(0.011)* 
-0.027 
(0.010)*** 
-0.018 
(0.011)* 
-0.027 
(0.010)*** 
-0.020 
(0.011)* 
 open 
0.322 
(0.163)** 
0.346 
(0.164)** 
0.322 
(0.163)** 
0.346 
(0.164)** 
0.332 
(0.164)** 
 nr 
-0.639 
(0.516) 
-0.841 
(0.503)* 
-0.649 
(0.516) 
-0.821 
(0.503)* 
-0.670 
(0.520) 
 inv 
1.490 
(0.768)* 
1.369 
(0.769)* 
1.490 
(0.767)* 
1.370 
(0.769)* 
1.474 
(0.771)* 
 frac  
-0.602 
(0.263)** 
 
-0.609 
(0.263)**  
-0.462 
(0.368) 
 pol  
-0.480 
(0.237)**  
 -0.468 
(0.237)** 
-0.191 
(0.328) 
 N 82 82 82 82 82 
 R2 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.41 
inst frac 
-1.802 
(0.898)**  
-1.905 
(0.802)** 
-1.910 
(0.802)** 
-1.904 
(0.802)** 
 pol  
-1.364 
(0.952)  
  
 frac*nr 
-3.890 
(2.674)     
 pol*nr  
-4.643 
(2.290)** 
-4.285 
(2.127)** 
-4.261 
(2.127)** 
-4.294 
(2.127)** 
 N 82 82 82 82 82 
 R2  0.15 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses; 
superscripts ***, ** and * correspond to a 1, 5, and 10% level of 
significance. 
 
In columns (3)-(5) we keep institutions dependent on the variables found to be 
significant in columns (1) and (2); namely fractionalization and polarization 
interacted with natural resource abundance (frac, pol*nr). In column (3) and (4) we 
alternate between fractionalization and polarization as our ethnic diversity proxy in 
the growth regression. When we let the two proxies enter jointly the growth 
specification in column (5), they both become insignificant as suggested in Hodler 
(2006) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a). Similar to columns (1) and (2) we 
find that ethnic fractionalization has a direct negative impact on the effectiveness of 
property rights, while polarization affects institutions only in a resource-rich context.  
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Table 2. SUR estimation of the system: introducing the interaction term 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
growth Y 0  
-0.168 
(0.056)*** 
-0.163 
(0.053)*** 
-0.175 
(0.055)*** 
-0.179 
(0.056)*** 
-0.162 
(0.056)*** 
 inst 
0.136 
(0.039)*** 
0.144 
(0.038)*** 
0.145 
(0.039)*** 
0.143 
(0.039)*** 
0.150 
(0.040)*** 
 geo 
-0.019 
(0.011)* 
-0.028 
(0.010)*** 
-0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.017 
(0.011) 
-0.027 
(0.010)*** 
 open 
0.338 
(0.165)** 
0.414 
(0.161)** 
0.342 
(0.162)** 
0.273 
(0.160)* 
0.282 
(0.163)* 
 nr 
-1.550 
(1.522) 
-3.937 
(1.321)*** 
-2.187 
(1.141)*   
 inv 
1.442 
(0.774)* 
1.289 
(1.730)* 
1.458 
(0.761)* 
1.617 
(0.770)** 
1.516 
(0.778)* 
 frac  
-0.756 
(0.361)**  
-0.755 
(0.280)*** 
-0.649 
(0.280)**  
 pol 
 
-0.966 
(0.301)***   
-0.458 
(0.263)* 
 frac*nr 
1.501 
(2.353)     
 pol*nr  
4.505 
(1.777)** 
2.245 
(1.476) 
-0.285 
(0.674) 
-0.384 
(0.687) 
 N 82 82 82 82 82 
 R2 0.41 0.45 0.43 0.40 0.38 
inst frac 
-1.802 
(0.898)**  
-1.908 
(0.802)** 
-1.908 
(0.802)** 
-1.927 
(0.802)** 
 pol  
-1.372 
(0.952)  
  
 frac*nr 
-3.888 
(2.674)     
 pol*nr  
-4.604 
(2.291)** 
-4.266 
(2.127)** 
-4.266 
(2.127)** 
-4.247 
(2.127)** 
 N 82 82 82 82 82 
 R2  0.14 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses; superscripts ***, 
** and * correspond to a 1, 5, and 10% level of significance. 
 
In Table 2, we introduce the interaction terms between natural resources and ethnic 
heterogeneity (frac*nr, pol*nr) both in the growth and institutions specifications, in 
order to control for possible direct effect of ethnic heterogeneity interacted with 
natural resources and economic growth. These specification changes also allow us to 
assess the robustness of our estimates and main results in Table 1. In columns (6) and 
(7) we incorporate natural resources interacted with fractionalization and 
polarization in the growth specification respectively. The signs and statistical 
significance of coefficients for the rest of the variables remain consistent with 
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previous results presented in Table (1). The interaction term between natural 
resources and polarization in the growth regression is statistically significant and 
positive in column (7), but the result is not robust when fractionalization rather than 
polarization enters directly the growth specification as in column (8). More 
importantly, any positive coefficients of the interaction terms in the growth 
specification (as in columns (7) and (8)) are most likely to be the result of 
multicollinearity between the natural resource proxy and the interaction terms; for 
this reason we drop in columns (9) and (10) the natural resource abundance variable 
from the growth specification, and we verify indeed a change in sign of the 
interaction term. With respect to the institutional channel (equation [2]), the 
coefficient of the interaction term between natural resources and polarization is 
consistent with our findings in Table 1 for all specifications, and we hence confirm 
that polarized countries experience enhanced rent-seeking and weak property rights 
in the presence of an extensive resource base.  
 
 
Additional Evidence: Ethnic Heterogeneity, Institutions and 
Income  
 
In this section we further examine the robustness of our results by replacing 
economic growth as the development dependent variable with the level of GDP per 
capita in 2004 (YT). Such estimations potentially provide a longer term analysis of 
economic development by focusing on the current world income distribution as the 
outcome of economic processes spanning beyond a period of a few decades 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002). Columns 11 and 12 of Table 3 replicate the 
specifications of column entries (1) and (2) of Table 1, with income levels now as the 
dependent variable.  
 
Our main results from the previous estimations of the institutional channel still hold, 
suggesting that ethnic fractionalization has a direct negative impact on the 
effectiveness of property rights, while polarization affects institutions only in a 
resource-rich context. For that reason, in columns (13) and (14) we keep institutions 
dependent on fractionalization and polarization interacted with natural resource 
abundance (frac, pol*nr), while alternating between fractionalization and polarization 
as the ethnic diversity proxy in the long-term income regression. We still find that 
polarized countries experience enhanced rent-seeking and weak property rights in 
the presence of an extensive resource base, although polarization now does not 
appear to have a direct statistically significant impact on long-term income (column 
entries (12) and (14)). 
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Table 3. SUR estimation of the system: level of GDP 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
YT inst 
0.402 
(0.075)*** 
0.414 
(0.070)*** 
0.395 
(0.067)*** 
0.437 
(0.070)*** 
0.400 
(0.068)*** 
 geo 
-0.083 
(0.020)*** 
-0.109 
(0.017)*** 
-0.083 
(0.020)*** 
-0.109 
(0.017)*** 
-0.077 
(0.022)*** 
 open 
0.361 
(0.327) 
0.398 
(0.339) 
0.361 
(0.327) 
0.396 
(0.339) 
0.339 
(0.330) 
 nr 
1.891 
(0.986)* 
1.417 
(0.998) 
1.871 
(0.986)* 
1.496 
(0.997) 
1.898 
(0.991)* 
 inv 
3.860 
(1.495)** 
3.677 
(1.542)** 
3.860 
(1.495)** 
3.684 
(1.542)** 
3.873 
(1.502)** 
 frac  
-1.376 
(0.515)***  
-1.390 
(0.515)*** 
 
-1.680 
(0.721)** 
 pol  
-0.689 
(0.486) 
 
-0.648 
(0.486) 
0.385 
(0.659) 
 N 82 82 82 82 82 
 R2 0.71 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.71 
inst frac 
-1.802 
(0.898)** 
 
-1.905 
(0.802)** 
-1.942 
(0.802)** 
-1.906 
(0.802)** 
 pol  
-1.368 
(0.952) 
   
 frac*nr 
-3.889 
(2.674) 
    
 pol*nr  
-4.624 
(2.290)** 
-4.284 
(2.127)** 
-4.205 
(2.126)** 
-4.276 
(2.127)** 
 N 82 82 82 82 82 
 R2  0.14 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses; superscripts ***, 
** and * correspond to a 1, 5, and 10% level of significance. 
 
  
The results of Table 3 suggest that the negative institutional impact of polarization in 
resource dependent nations is likely to reflect a much longer-term resource-curse 
effect than that captured by most growth empirics spanning a period of three or four 
decades. While most resource curse empirical analyses (Gylfason 2001; Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh 2004, 2007; Sachs and Warner 2001)) present the curse as a phenomenon 
of the last three to four decades, our results imply that even if there was a positive 
impact of natural resources on institutions and income in the past (as suggested by 
Matsuyama (1992) and Wright (1990)), this has been largely outweighed by the more 
recent effect of resource affluence on property rights and growth, as suggested by 
our preceding growth analysis. 
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Conclusions 
 
Resource-rich countries constitute both development failures and successes 
depending on their underlying socioeconomic fundamentals. Recent empirical 
evidence and theoretical work provide support to a resource curse hypothesis based 
on ethnic fractionalization; competing ethnic groups engaging in resource rent-
seeking weaken property rights and erode institutional quality, reducing hence long-
term growth. At the same time a separate branch of development economics 
distinguishes between the impact of ethnic fractionalization and polarization on 
institutions and economic outcomes, suggesting that polarization is a stronger 
deterrent of long-term growth. In this paper we bring the two streams of literature 
together and examine the interlinkages between natural resources and both measures 
of ethnic heterogeneity. We estimate simultaneously a two-equation system where 
economic growth depends on institutions (property rights protection) (equation [1]) 
and institutions depends on ethnic diversity and on the interaction between ethnic 
diversity and natural resource abundance (equation [2]). We find that natural 
resources appear to be a curse in ethnically polarized rather than fractionalized 
communities, suggesting that rivalry amongst groups of similar size is likely to 
intensify rent-seeking and conflictual behavior.  
  
This is an important finding for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that weak 
institutions are more likely to persist in resource-rich states with ethnically polarized 
rather than fractionalized populations. This has significant policy implications for the 
new Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, an international scheme with the 
support of the World Bank and several donor countries that currently aims at 
reducing the extent of corruption and rent-seeking in developing mineral-dependent 
economies. The initiative is likely to have a greater impact in countries dominated by 
few ethnic groups of similar size rather than in ethnically homogenous or 
fractionalized states. Secondly, our analysis reveals that resource abundance in 
ethnically polarized countries has had both a medium term negative impact on 
economic growth (Section 2), as well as a longer term effect on the current income 
distribution (Section 3). This suggests that the combination of ethnic polarization and 
natural resources is likely to have been a long-lasting poverty trap for several 
resource-rich countries. 
  
Future research could shed further light into the relationship between natural 
resources, economic growth and ethnic structure. We propose several extensions of 
our current analysis. First, we should try to distinguish between ethnic, linguistic 
and religious measures of polarization (and fractionalization) and test whether the 
results of our analysis hold for different classifications of ethnic heterogeneity. 
Furthermore, we need to acknowledge that the current polarization and 
fractionalization indices are still far from perfect, as they focus exclusively on 
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population structures, ignoring hence the relative financial and military power of 
groups, or potential long term alliances amongst them. Developing fractionalization 
and polarization indices with such qualitative attributes will certainly improve the 
accuracy of our estimations. Last, institutional quality is more likely to be negatively 
correlated with resource wealth created by mining rather than farming. The 
distinction of the resource rents source and its pointness (i.e., geographic 
concentration, as is often the case for mineral resources) might hence provide 
valuable information to the causes of the resource curse. 
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1 Appendix I: Variable Description 
 
 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Label Source: 
growth 
Growth rate of GDP per capita, 
1980-2004 (constant 2000 US$) 
(WDI 2006) 
Y 0  
Log of GDP per capita 1980 
(constant 2000 US$) 
(WDI 2006) 
YT 
Log of GDP per capita 2004 
(constant 2000 US$) 
(WDI 2006) 
frac Ethnic Fractionalization Index (Alesina et al. 2003) 
pol Ethnic Polarization Index (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005a) 
inst 
Legal System and Property Rights 
Index (1-10 scale) in 1980  
(Gwartney and Lawson 2006) 
nr Primary Exports/GNP in 1970 (Sachs and Warner 2001) 
inv 
Investment share of GDP in 1980  
 
(Heston et al. 2006) 
open 
Openess to trade in 1980  
(Import plus Exports / GDP in 2000 
constant prices) 
(Heston et al. 2006) 
geo 
Malaria Ecology, pop-weighted, v. 
sep 2003 
(Kiszewski et al. 2004) 
pol*nr 
Intearction btw Ethnic Polarization 
and Primary exports/GNP 
 
frac*nr 
Intearction btw Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
and Primary exports/GNP 
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2 Appendix II: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N mean 
Stand. 
Dev. 
median min max 
Y 0  82 7.738 1.576 7.548 4.909 10.722 
YT 82 7.975 1.723 7.782 4.479 10.571 
growth 82 0.377 0.593 0.273 -0.649 2.962 
inst 82 4.916 1.932 4.666 1.759 8.347 
inv 82 0.182 0.090 0.184 0.042 0.488 
geo 82 3.786 7.024 0.163 0.000 30.095 
open 82 0.584 0.385 0.476 0.093 2.298 
nr 82 0.130 0.126 0.100 0.006 0.728 
pol 82 0.524 0.243 0.577 0.020 0.982 
frac 82 0.441 0.268 0.484 0.002 0.875 
pol*nr 82 0.076 0.101 0.052 0.000 0.713 
frac*nr 82 0.067 0.090 0.050 0.000 0.481 
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